In testimony before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Vanda Felbab-Brown discussed how narcotics production influences the security, political, and economic developments in Afghanistan. Felbab-Brown also examined the effectiveness of policies to mitigate these effects and offered recommendations for the future of U. Sonic Unleashed Ps3 Iso Download on this page. S. Policy on the issue.

Madam Chairman and Members of the Caucus: I am honored to have this opportunity to address the Caucus on the important issue of how narcotics production influences the security, political, and economic developments in Afghanistan and on the effectiveness of policies to mitigate these effects. The drug-violence nexus in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world is the domain of my work, the subject of my forthcoming book, (Brookings Institution Press, 2009). I have conducted fieldwork on these issues in Afghanistan, as well as elsewhere in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Since 2001, Afghanistan has become synonymous with narcostate and the spread of crime and illegality.

During 2007 and 2008, the Afghan drug economy reached levels unprecedented in the history of the modern drug trade at least since World War II, and so far has escaped efforts of the international community and the Afghan government to contain and reduce it. Narcotics production and counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan are of critical importance not only for the control of drugs there, but also for the security, reconstruction, and rule of law efforts in Afghanistan. However, premature and inappropriate counternarcotics efforts greatly complicate counterterrorism and counterinsurgency objectives, and hence also jeopardize economic reconstruction and state-building efforts. They are also unsustainable in the long term and indeed counterproductive even for the narrow goal of narcotics suppression. At least until the new counternarcotics policy that the Obama administration indicated this summer it would undertake – defunding and deemphasizing eradication and focusing on interdiction and rural development – counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan unfortunately had these undesirable effects. The new policy, if implemented well, promises to redress many of the deficiencies of previous efforts and synergistically enhance counterinsurgency and counterterrorism objectives.

Afghanistan’s Urban National Priority Program reaches an important. To shape the country’s urban growth presented in the “Urban National Priority. 1.b What are the National Priority Programs (NPPs)? National Priority Programs refer to a set of 22. SBPS State Budget Planning System for Afghanistan. The Host 2013 Film Torrent Download Ita.

Basic Overview of the Drug Economy and Its Broad Impacts. Tuesday, May 30, 2017 In a country where somewhere between a third and a half of a country’s GDP comes from poppy cultivation and processing and much of the rest from foreign aid, the illicit poppy economy inevitably determines the economic survival of a large segment of the population.

This is not only true of the farmers who cultivate opium poppy frequently in the absence of viable legal and illegal economic alternatives. As a result of micro- and macro-economic spillovers and the acute paucity of legal economic activity, much of the economic life even in large cities, such as the construction and sales of both consumer goods and durables, is underpinned by the poppy economy. After a quarter century of intense poppy cultivation, the opium poppy economy is deeply entrenched in the socio-economic fabric of the society, Islamic prohibitions against opiates notwithstanding, and inevitably underlies its political arrangements and power relations.

Profits from taxing poppy cultivation and protecting smuggling rings bring substantial income to the Taliban – on the order of tens of millions dollars a year, accounting for perhaps as much as half of its income. But many other actors in Afghanistan profit from the opium poppy economy in a similar way: former warlords cum government officials, members of the Afghanistan’s police, tribal chiefs, and independent traffickers. Moreover, actors, such as the Taliban, who protect the opium poppy economy from efforts to suppress it, derive much more than simply financial profits. Crucially, they also obtain political capital from populations dependent on poppy cultivation. Such political capital is a critical determinant of the success and sustainability of the insurgency. Indeed, along with the provision of rule of order that the Afghan government is systematically unable to provide and capitalization on Ghilzai Pashtun sentiments of being marginalized, protection of the poppy fields is at the core of the Taliban support.

By 2016 By not targeting the farmers, a counternarcotics strategy can thus be synchronized with the counterinsurgency efforts because it can deprive the Taliban of a critical source of support. A strong emphasis on rural development also promises to lay the necessary groundwork for substantial reductions in the size and impacts of the illicit economy in Afghanistan. A well-designed interdiction program will further complement the counternarcotics, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and state-building efforts by helping to establish a rule of law. However, how interdiction and rural development are operationalized will to a great extent determine the effectiveness of the strategy not only with respect to the narrow goal of narcotics suppression, but also with respect to counterinsurgency and state-building. Effects of Previous Eradication-Centered Policy and of Interdiction Measures and Alternative Livelihoods Efforts Undertaken Until 2009.